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II.-93 
A GRAY AREA: THE SCOPE OF TITLE II OF 
THE ADA’S APPLICABILITY TO AD HOC 
POLICE ENCOUNTERS 
Abstract: On February 22, 2019, in Gray v. Cummings, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit considered whether, and to what extent, Title II of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) applies to police encounters, includ-
ing arrests. Recognizing that courts disagree on the point during an arrest at 
which Title II begins to apply, the First Circuit declined to enter the debate, as-
suming instead that Title II applied to the police encounter at hand for the pur-
pose of adjudicating the claim on narrower grounds. This Comment argues that 
the next time the question of Title II’s applicability to arrests reaches the First 
Circuit, the court should adopt the approach embraced by the majority of circuits. 
The majority approach properly finds that Title II applies to arrests without ex-
ception and that exigent circumstances, rather than bar Title II claims, weigh in 
the balance of assessing the reasonableness of a proposed accommodation. This 
approach better reflects the language of, and legislative intent behind, Title II and 
appropriately balances the safety concerns of both disabled individuals and law 
enforcement personnel by allowing for a more fact-specific inquiry. 
INTRODUCTION 
Although fewer than four in every one hundred adults in the United States 
have a severe mental illness, these individuals make approximately one in eve-
ry ten calls for police assistance.1 Even more disconcerting, the mentally disa-
bled make up a disproportionate number of those killed while interacting with 
police.2 Indeed, individuals with untreated mental illnesses are sixteen times 
more likely to be killed by police than other civilians.3 These violent police 
encounters often give rise to civil lawsuits alleging discriminatory treatment, 
for which the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA) is a common vehi-
cle.4 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Doris A. Fuller et al., Overlooked in the Undercounted: The Role of Mental Illness in Fatal Law 
Enforcement Encounters, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR. 1 (2015), https://www.treatmentadvocacy
center.org/storage/documents/overlooked-in-the-undercounted.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3DR-U7YH]. 
Indeed, approximately one in three individuals who are transported to the emergency room for psychi-
atric care are brought there by the police. Id. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 See 2 MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER CUCULO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIM-
INAL § 11-2 (3d ed. 2018) (noting that the number of claims filed under the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (the ADA) has far surpassed original expectations); see, e.g., Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1, 
7 (1st Cir. 2019) (assessing a cause of action under Title II of the ADA in response to alleged discrim-
II.-94 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
The ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability.5 Title II in 
particular ensures that individuals with disabilities are able to participate in, 
and thus benefit from, the “services, programs, or activities” of public entities.6 
Because the ADA does not define the phrase “services, programs, or activi-
ties,” courts are divided on whether arrests and other police encounters fall 
within the scope of this language.7 The answer to this question has proved to 
be insignificant, however, because the statute contains a catchall provision en-
abling individuals to state a claim under Title II simply by demonstrating that 
they were “subjected to discrimination” by a public entity.8 
Nevertheless, courts also disagree on the point during an arrest at which 
Title II begins to apply.9 Indeed, several courts have held that Title II of the 
ADA applies to the entire arrest without exception, whereas the Fifth Circuit 
has held that the mandates of Title II are inapplicable prior to the officers se-
curing the scene.10 
In 2019, in Gray v. Cummings, the First Circuit joined the discussion, 
considering for the first time whether, and to what extent, Title II applies to 
police encounters involving disabled individuals.11 The First Circuit declined 
                                                                                                                           
ination that occurred during the course of a violent police encounter); Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 
171, 174 (3d Cir. 2018) (same); Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1075 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(same). Title II claims arising from a police encounter with a disabled individual are often accompa-
nied by claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Gray, 917 F.3d at 7 (evaluating claims asserted 
under both Title II and § 1983); Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 797–98 (5th Cir. 2000) (same). See 
generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165 (setting forth the mandates of Title II of the ADA). Section 
1983 provides a cause of action against any person who, under color of state law, causes another per-
son to be deprived of the “rights, privileges, or immunities” guaranteed by the Constitution. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (2018); see also Gray, 917 F.3d at 7–8 (discussing Gray’s § 1983 claims). 
 5 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2018) (providing that the purpose of Title II of the ADA is to 
eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities). 
 6 Id. § 12132. 
 7 See id. § 12131 (defining only “public entity” and “qualified individual with a disability”); 
Haberle, 885 F.3d at 180 (noting that courts disagree on whether arrests constitute “services, pro-
grams, or activities of a public entity”). 
 8 See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (stating that “no qualified individual with a disability shall . . . be sub-
jected to discrimination by any such entity”); Haberle, 885 F.3d at 180 (referring to the “subjected to 
discrimination” language as a “catch-all phrase”). 
 9 Haberle, 885 F.3d at 181. Compare Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1085 (affirming that Title II applies to 
the entire police encounter at hand), with Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801 (holding that Title II does not apply 
until police officers “secur[e] the scene” and “ensur[e] that there is no threat to human life”). 
 10 Compare Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1085 (stating that there is no question as to Title II’s applicability 
to the police encounter at hand because Title II prohibits public entities from discriminating based on 
disability regardless of when the discriminatory treatment occurred), and Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 
1216, 1221 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that the law does not provide for a categorical rule excluding 
arrests from Title II’s reach), with Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801 (holding that Title II is inapplicable to ad 
hoc police encounters before the officer is able to “secur[e] the scene” and “ensur[e] that there is no 
threat to human life”). 
 11 Gray, 917 F.3d at 16; see also Maria Cramer, An Officer Tased a Bipolar Patient. Did He Vio-
late a Law Protecting the Disabled?, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.bostonglobe.com/
metro/2019/01/09/woman-fleeing-hospital-tased-she-protected-federal-law-for-disabled/XVpyhz6L8
2020] The Scope of Title II of the ADA and Ad Hoc Police Encounters II.-95 
to answer the question, however, choosing to assume that Title II applied to the 
incident at hand for the sole purpose of adjudicating the claim on narrower 
grounds.12 
Part I of this Comment develops the legal, factual, and procedural back-
ground of Gray.13 Part II considers the inconsistent approaches that circuit 
courts of appeals have utilized in applying Title II of the ADA to arrests, and 
highlights the First Circuit’s reluctance to adhere to either one.14 Finally, Part 
III suggests that the First Circuit in Gray should have adopted the approach 
embraced by the majority of circuits, rather than that of the Fifth Circuit, as the 
majority approach better adheres to the language of, and legislative intent be-
hind, Title II.15 It further argues that the majority approach, by allowing for a 
more fact-specific inquiry, provides better protection for both disabled individ-
uals and law enforcement personnel.16 
I. TITLE II OF THE ADA AND ITS APPLICATION TO GRAY V. CUMMINGS 
In 2019, in Gray v. Cummings, the First Circuit was presented with an is-
sue that has troubled its sister courts—the scope of Title II’s application to po-
lice encounters.17 Section A of this Part describes Title II of the ADA.18 Sec-
tion B develops the facts and procedural posture of Gray, leading up to the 
First Circuit’s analysis.19 
A. Title II of the ADA 
The ADA is designed to protect individuals with qualified disabilities 
from discrimination.20 Title II, in particular, states that “qualified individuals” 
                                                                                                                           
ZZSy4lmRzvvNI/story.html [https://perma.cc/578D-ST8M] (describing the question facing the First 
Circuit in Gray as whether the tactics employed by police officers in subduing individuals with disa-
bilities can be limited by the ADA and, if so, which tactics are permissible). 
 12 Gray, 917 F.3d at 17–18. 
 13 See infra notes 17–52 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 54–90 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 91–116 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 91–116 and accompanying text. 
 17 See Gray, 917 F.3d at 16 (noting that determining whether and to what extent Title II applies to 
ad hoc police encounters during the course of an investigation or arrest is a difficult question, to which 
the answer is “less than certain”). 
 18 See infra notes 20–33 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 34–53 and accompanying text. 
 20 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (noting that the purpose of the ADA is “to provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabil-
ities”). When the ADA was enacted, Congress recognized that approximately forty-three million 
Americans were suffering from one or more mental or physical disabilities, and that, out of those 
forty-three million, individuals who had experienced discrimination were particularly likely to be 
denied proper legal recourse. PERLIN & CUCULO, supra note 4, § 11-2; see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101(a)(4) (stating that those who experience discrimination on the basis of disability have typical-
II.-96 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
may not be denied the opportunity to participate in, and thus reap the benefits 
of, a public entity’s “services, programs, or activities,” and it contains no statu-
tory exceptions, thereby evidencing its broad scope.21 
Although the ADA clearly defines the phrases “qualified individual with a 
disability” and “public entity,” it does not provide a definition for the phrase 
“services, programs, or activities.”22 As such, courts are divided on whether 
arrests made by police officers constitute the “services, programs, or activities” 
of a public entity, such that the arrest itself, or the manner in which it is carried 
out, may constitute discrimination.23 Title II is framed in the alternative, how-
                                                                                                                           
ly had no legal recourse to help remedy such discrimination, particularly when compared to those who 
experience discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age). 
 21 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (stating that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of 
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, 
or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity”); see also Gray, 
917 F.3d at 14–15 (differentiating Title II from Titles I and III, which prevent disability-related dis-
crimination in employment and in the provision of public accommodations respectively). 
 22 See 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (providing definitions for “public entity” and “qualified individual with 
a disability” alone); see also Ryan Lefkowitz, What Are You En(title)d Two? Protecting Individuals 
with Disabilities During Interactions with Law Enforcement Under Title II of the ADA, 49 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 707, 717 (2019) (noting that Title II does not define “services, programs, or activities”). Title II 
defines a “qualified individual with a disability” as “an individual with a disability who, with or with-
out reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communica-
tion, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential 
eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provid-
ed by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). The term “disability” refers to “a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual,” “a record of 
such impairment,” or “being regarded as having such an impairment.” Id. § 12102(1). A “public enti-
ty” is defined as “any State or local government,” as well as “any department, agency, special purpose 
district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government . . . .” Id. § 12131(1). Thus, 
because a police department is undoubtedly a “public entity,” it is undisputed that its “services, pro-
grams, or activities” are governed by Title II. See Gray, 917 F.3d at 16 (stating that Title II undeniably 
controls the “services, programs, and activities of a municipal police department”); see also Haberle, 
885 F.3d at 179–80 (stating that police departments easily fall within the definition of a public entity). 
Additionally, Title II of the ADA does not define “discrimination.” Mark C. Weber, Accidentally on 
Purpose: Intent in Disability Discrimination Law, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1417, 1432 (2015). Rather, it pro-
vides that the Attorney General shall promulgate regulations setting forth the conduct a public entity 
may or may not engage in. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a)–(b); see also Weber, supra, at 1432 (noting that the 
Attorney General’s regulations must be consistent with the regulations set forth by the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare governing recipients of federal financial assistance under section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973). For example, one regulation states that a public entity cannot in-
troduce “eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability . . . from 
fully and equally enjoying any service, program, or activity, unless such criteria can be shown to be 
necessary for the provision of the service, program, or activity being offered.” 28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.130(b)(8) (2019). 
 23 Haberle, 885 F.3d at 180. Compare Sheehan v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 
1232 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d in part and cert. dismissed in part by 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2015) (de-
claring that the phrase “services, programs, or activities” should be interpreted broadly to cover “any-
thing a public entity does”), with Rosen v. Montgomery Cty., 121 F.3d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 1997) (stat-
ing that characterizing an arrest as a “program or activity” of a county is “a stretch of the statutory 
language and of the underlying legislative intent.”). Indeed, the Fourth Circuit stated that it is extreme-
2020] The Scope of Title II of the ADA and Ad Hoc Police Encounters II.-97 
ever, allowing plaintiffs to prevail merely by proving that they experienced 
discrimination at the hands of a public entity, rather than that arrests fall within 
a public entity’s “services, programs, or activities.”24 As a result, several courts 
have avoided categorizing them as such.25 Accordingly, whether based on the 
conclusion that arrests constitute the “services, programs or activities” of a 
public entity or on the statute’s blanket prohibition of discrimination by a pub-
lic entity, courts are in general agreement that Title II governs arrests.26 
Courts have recognized two ways that a police officer may violate Title II 
of the ADA while executing an arrest.27 The first, which the First Circuit refers 
to as the “effects” theory, provides that a police officer may violate the ADA 
by improperly arresting an individual with a disability because the officer mis-
perceived the disability’s outward manifestations as criminal activity.28 The 
second, known as the “accommodation” theory, provides that a police officer 
                                                                                                                           
ly difficult to place an arrest within the ADA. Rosen, 121 F.3d at 157 (declining to hold that a drunk 
driving arrest was covered under Title II). The Fourth Circuit reasoned that in order to benefit from a 
county’s “services, programs, or activities,” the disabled individual must participate voluntarily. See 
id. (citing to Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1347 (4th Cir. 1995), for the proposition that the lan-
guage of § 12131(b) implies voluntariness of the disabled individual). The Supreme Court has subse-
quently called the Fourth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of Title II into question. See Pa. Dep’t of 
Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 211 (1998) (rejecting the argument that prison “services, programs, or 
activities” do not fall within the scope of Title II simply because participation in them is involuntary); 
Lefkowitz, supra note 22, at 717; see also Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 912 (8th Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing that “services, programs, or activities” of a public entity need not be voluntary in order to be cov-
ered by Title II of the ADA). Recently, courts that have held that arrests are a public service or activi-
ty have relied, at least in part, on a Department of Justice regulation that states that Title II applies to 
“all services, programs, and activities provided or made available by public entities.” 28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.102 (emphasis added). 
 24 See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such 
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”) (emphasis added). 
 25 See, e.g., Haberle, 885 F.3d at 180 (concluding that it is unnecessary to decide whether arrests 
constitute the “services, programs, or activities” of a public entity due to the language of § 12132, 
which allows arrestees to demonstrate instead that they were “subjected to discrimination” by the 
police); Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1084 (declining to enter the debate as to whether police conduct during 
the course of an arrest falls within the “services, programs, or activities” of public entities in light of 
Title II’s catchall phrase). 
 26 Lefkowitz, supra note 22, at 718; see Haberle, 885 F.3d at 181 (noting that no court of appeals 
had found the ADA to be wholly inapplicable to law enforcement encounters). 
 27 E.g., Gray, 917 F.3d at 15; Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1220–21. 
 28 Gray, 917 F.3d at 15 (citing Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1220). Other courts have referred to this theo-
ry as the “wrongful-arrest” theory. See, e.g., Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1221. For example, a police officer 
may violate the ADA under this theory when the officer arrests a deaf individual for failing to follow 
oral instructions. Alexis D. Campbell, Note, Failure on the Front Line: How the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act Should Be Interpreted to Better Protect Persons in Mental Health Crisis from Fatal Po-
lice Shootings, 51 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 313, 330–31 (2019); see, e.g., Lewis v. Truitt, 960 F. 
Supp. 175, 178–79 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (denying the police officers’ motion for summary judgment 
where the arrestee claimed that he was arrested for “Resisting Law Enforcement” in spite of the fact 
that the officers knew he was deaf and that they failed to take the necessary steps to communicate with 
him). 
II.-98 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
may violate the ADA by failing to reasonably accommodate an individual’s 
disability during the course of an arrest, thus causing the individual to suffer 
unnecessary harm.29 
Notably, the latter theory generally requires the consideration of exigent 
circumstances, which threaten human life or safety, as they are critical in de-
termining the reasonableness of a proposed accommodation.30 Although all 
courts to apply the “accommodation” theory have concluded that exigent cir-
cumstances play a significant role in evaluating Title II’s applicability to ar-
rests, they disagree on the nature of that role.31 Indeed, some courts have held 
that exigent circumstances relieve officers of their duty to reasonably accom-
modate an individual’s disability entirely, thus precluding the individual from 
bringing a claim under Title II of the ADA.32 In contrast, other courts have 
held that exigent circumstances shed light on the reasonableness of an officer’s 
actions, but do not operate as a prohibitive bar to liability.33 
                                                                                                                           
 29 Gray, 917 F.3d at 15. A Department of Justice regulation supports this theory, stating that “[a] 
public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modi-
fications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can 
demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, pro-
gram, or activity.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i). The “reasonable modifications” required by the DOJ 
regulation refer to the “reasonable accommodations” that form the basis of the “accommodation” 
theory. See Carly A. Myers, Note, Police Violence Against People with Mental Disabilities: The Im-
mutable Duty Under the ADA to Reasonably Accommodate During Arrest, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1393, 
1410 (2017) (noting that a claim under the accommodation theory is typically characterized as a fail-
ure to make reasonable modifications). 
 30 See Robyn Levin, Note, Responsiveness to Difference: ADA Accommodations in the Course of 
an Arrest, 69 STAN. L. REV. 269, 282, 285 (2017) (indicating that courts adjudicating reasonable ac-
commodation claims must consider whether the exigent circumstances made the requested accommo-
dation unreasonable). An exigent circumstance is defined as (1) “[a] situation that demands unusual or 
immediate action and that may allow people to circumvent usual procedures,” or (2) “[a] situation in 
which a police officer must take immediate action to effectively make an arrest, search, or seizure for 
which probable cause exists,” and  “[e]xigent circumstances may exist if . . . a person’s life or safety is 
threatened.” Exigent Circumstances, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Myers, 
supra note 29, at 1413 (defining exigent circumstances as circumstances that are present where a 
person’s unlawful activity causes a perceived danger to a police officer or the public at large). 
 31 Myers, supra note 3129, at 1413. 
 32 See, e.g., Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801 (holding that Title II claims are unavailable where the exi-
gent circumstances are such that a threat to human life exists). 
 33 See, e.g., Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232 (concluding that exigent circumstances speak to the rea-
sonableness of a proposed accommodation). The Supreme Court attempted to clarify this issue in 
2015 when it issued its decision in City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan. 135 S. Ct. at 1772–74. 
In its petition for certiorari, San Francisco requested that the Court determine “[w]hether Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act requires law enforcement to provide accommodations to an armed, 
violent, and mentally ill suspect in the course of bringing the suspect into custody.” Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari, Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (No. 13-1412). After the Court granted certiorari, however, 
San Francisco declined to raise this issue before the Court, instead conceding that arrests of disabled 
individuals fall under Title II. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1778–79 (Scalia, J., concurring). As a result, the 
Court did not address this question, dismissing it as “improvidently granted.” Id. at 1769. Notably, in 
2018, when the Supreme Court had another opportunity to answer this very same question, the Court 
declined to do so. See Vos v. City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024, 1037 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. de-
2020] The Scope of Title II of the ADA and Ad Hoc Police Encounters II.-99 
B. The Factual Background and Procedural Posture of Gray 
On May 2, 2013, Judith Gray, who suffered from bipolar disorder, had a 
manic episode and called the police for assistance.34 Police officers from the 
Athol Police Department transported Gray to Athol Memorial Hospital where 
she was admitted pursuant to a Massachusetts law permitting the involuntary 
hospitalization of individuals who pose a serious risk of harm due to mental 
illness.35 Approximately six hours later, however, when hospital staff discov-
ered that Gray left the hospital without authorization, they called the police and 
requested that they locate and return Gray, a “section 12 patient,” to the hospi-
tal.36 Thomas Cummings, a police officer of the Athol Police Department, re-
sponded to the request and quickly located Gray.37 
Despite Officer Cummings’s repeated requests that Gray return to the 
hospital, she refused to comply with his demands.38 A physical confrontation 
ensued once Gray turned and approached Officer Cummings with clenched 
fists.39 As a result, Officer Cummings brought Gray to the ground and ordered 
that she place her hands behind her back.40 When she did not obey his instruc-
tions, he threatened to tase her.41 Gray’s continued defiance led Officer Cum-
mings to place the Taser in “drive stun” mode before tasing her in the back for 
approximately four to six seconds.42 At this point, he was able to handcuff 
                                                                                                                           
nied, 139 S. Ct. 2613 (2019) (mem.). In Vos v. City of Newport Beach, the Ninth Circuit had reversed 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the city on the ADA claim, holding that the 
officers in question had time to employ the requested accommodations. Id. 
 34 Gray, 917 F.3d at 5–6. 
 35 Id. at 6; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123, § 12 (2018) (authorizing involuntary “[e]merg-
ency restraint and hospitalization of persons posing risk of serious harm by reason of mental illness”). 
 36 Gray, 917 F.3d at 6. In Massachusetts, a “section 12 patient” is an individual who poses “risk 
of serious harm by reason of mental illness” and therefore requires “[e]mergency restraint and hospi-
talization.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123, § 12. 
 37 Gray, 917 F.3d at 6. When Officer Cummings located Gray, she was less than a quarter mile 
from the hospital walking barefoot along the sidewalk. Id. Officer Cummings had graduated from the 
Boylston Regional Police Academy in 2011, where he was trained to interact with individuals suffer-
ing from mental illness. Gray v. Cummings, No. 15-10276, 2017 WL 8942566, at *2 (D. Mass. 2017). 
 38 Gray, 917 F.3d at 6. When Officer Cummings pleaded with Gray to return to the hospital, she 
responded with profanity. Id. Although Officer Cummings requested backup, he did not wait for it to 
arrive. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 6, Gray, 917 F.3d 1 (No. 18-1303). 
 39 Gray, 917 F.3d at 6. 
 40 Id. Notably, there was a substantial size differential between Officer Cummings and Gray—
Officer Cummings was six feet, three inches tall and weighed 215 pounds, whereas Gray was five 
feet, ten inches tall and weighed one hundred and forty pounds. Id. 
 41 Id. Indeed, rather than heed Officer Cummings’s warning, Gray “tucked her arms underneath 
her chest and flex[ed] tightly.” Id. 
 42 Id. at 6–7. Tasers typically have two modes: “dart mode” and “drive stun” mode. Brief for the 
Defendants-Appellees, Thomas A. Cummings; Town of Athol, Massachusetts, at 27 n.6, Gray, 917 
F.3d 1 (No. 18-1303). When a Taser is in “dart mode,” it is capable of overriding a person’s central 
nervous system. Id. “Drive stun” mode, on the other hand, is a less painful mode that causes tempo-
rary, localized pain and is incapable of overriding the target’s central nervous system. Id. at 18, 27 n.6. 
As a result, however, Gray still suffered considerable pain and lost consciousness. Brief of Plaintiff-
II.-100 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
Gray, and she was ultimately transported back to the hospital.43 Although 
charges were initially filed against Gray for “assault on a police officer, resist-
ing arrest, disturbing the peace, and disorderly conduct,” the charges were ul-
timately dropped.44 
Gray then brought suit against Officer Cummings and the town of Athol, 
Massachusetts in the United States District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts, asserting, among other violations, a cause of action under Title II of the 
ADA against Athol.45 With respect to the ADA claim, Gray advanced argu-
ments under both the “effects” theory and the “accommodation” theory.46 First, 
Gray claimed that the criminal charges filed against her served as evidence that 
Officer Cummings misperceived her refusal to comply as criminal behavior, 
rather than recognizing that her behavior was simply a symptom of her disabil-
ity.47 Second, Gray argued that Officer Cummings should have accommodated 
her disability by, for example, waiting for the assistance of an ambulance or a 
mental health professional.48 
Following discovery, Officer Cummings and Athol moved for summary 
judgment, the consideration of which was referred to a magistrate judge.49 The 
magistrate judge concluded that Officer Cummings did not violate the ADA 
                                                                                                                           
Appellant, supra note 38, at 15. Athol Police Department’s protocol as it pertains to the use of a Taser 
states that officers should not use Tasers on “[t]hose known to be suffering from severe mental ill-
ness.” Id. at 6. 
 43 Gray, 917 F.3d at 7. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. Notably, a claim under Title II of the ADA may only be brought against a public entity, 
rather than an individual defendant. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (preventing disabled individuals from 
being excluded from the “services, programs, or activities of a public entity” or from being “subjected 
to discrimination by any such entity”) (emphasis added). As such, Gray was unable to bring a claim 
under Title II against Officer Cummings himself. See id.; Gray, 917 F.3d at 14. Gray also brought 
state-law claims for assault and battery, malicious prosecution, and violations of the Massachusetts 
Civil Rights Act, as well as two separate causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against both Athol 
and Officer Cummings. Gray, 917 F.3d at 7. She sought both monetary damages and injunctive relief. 
Id. at 19. First, Gray’s § 1983 claim against Officer Cummings asserted that he used excessive force 
during her arrest and, as a result, violated her Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 8. To succeed on this 
claim, Gray had to demonstrate that, under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Cummings used 
an unreasonable amount of force during the course of the arrest. Id. To determine whether a given use 
of force is reasonable, a number of factors must be considered, including the severity of the crime, 
whether and to what extent the suspect posed a threat, and whether the suspect resisted arrest in any 
way. Id. Next, Gray alleged that Athol violated her Fourth Amendment rights by inadequately training 
its offers to appropriately interact with individuals suffering from mental illness. Id. at 13–14. For a 
town to be held liable on a failure-to-train claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the town knew, or 
should have known, that the training was deficient and displayed deliberate indifference to the uncon-
stitutional consequences of these deficiencies. Id. at 14. To demonstrate deliberate indifference, a 
plaintiff typically must present a pattern of constitutional violations by untrained employees. Id. 
 46 Gray, 917 F.3d at 15. 
 47 Id. at 15–16. 
 48 Id. at 16. 
 49 Id. at 7. 
2020] The Scope of Title II of the ADA and Ad Hoc Police Encounters II.-101 
because, despite Gray’s disability, he employed a reasonable amount of force 
in light of the existing threat.50 The district court adopted the magistrate 
judge’s recommendation as it pertained to the ADA claim in full.51 Gray ap-
pealed the district court’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit.52 The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of Athol on Gray’s Title II claim, concluding that Gray 
failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the officer’s delib-
erate indifference to the risk of an ADA violation.53 
II. COURTS DISAGREE ON WHETHER, AND TO WHAT EXTENT,  
TITLE II OF THE ADA APPLIES TO ARRESTS 
Although no federal circuit has held Title II of the ADA to be entirely in-
applicable to arrests, courts are divided on one significant issue—the exact 
extent to which it applies to arrests.54 As a result, an individual bringing an 
ADA claim in one jurisdiction may be effectively barred from bringing the 
same claim in another.55 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Id. Additionally, the magistrate judge found no violation of the Fourth Amendment on the part 
of either Officer Cummings or Athol, recommending summary judgment in favor of both defendants 
on the § 1983 claim. Id. Specifically, with regard to the claim against Officer Cummings, the magis-
trate judge found that, as a matter of law, the use of a Taser in drive stun mode was reasonable given 
the circumstances at hand. Id. at 8. Moreover, the magistrate judge determined that, even if Officer 
Cummings had committed a constitutional violation, he was entitled to qualified immunity because he 
did not infringe on a clearly established constitutional right. Gray, 2017 WL 8942566, at *7. Indeed, 
to successfully raise a qualified immunity defense, a defendant must demonstrate that the allegedly 
violated constitutional right was not “clearly established” at the time of the violation, such that the 
defendant did not have fair notice that the conduct was unconstitutional. Id. Here, the magistrate judge 
concluded that the right was not clearly established because a reasonable person in Officer Cum-
mings’s shoes would not have believed that using a Taser to subdue Gray was unlawful. Id. at *9. 
Additionally, because a constitutional violation on the part of an Athol police officer is required to 
hold Athol liable for failure to train under § 1983, and the magistrate judge had found no such viola-
tion, the magistrate recommended granting Athol’s motion for summary judgment. Id. The district 
court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation. Gray, 917 F.3d at 7; Gray v. Cummings, 4:15-
CV-10276, 2018 WL 1956872, at *1 (D. Mass. 2018). It declined, however, to address the magis-
trate’s finding that Officer “Cummings employed reasonable force under all of the circumstances,” 
because it agreed that “the right not to be tased while offering non-violent, stationary, resistance to a 
lawful seizure was not [cl]early established at the time of the confrontation between . . . Gray and 
Officer Cummings.” Gray, 917 F.3d at 7; Gray, 2018 WL 1956872, at *1. 
 51 See Gray, 2018 WL 1956872, at *1 (adopting the Report and Recommendation of the magis-
trate judge). 
 52 Gray, 917 F.3d at 7. 
 53 Id. at 18–19. 
 54 Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1, 16–17 (1st Cir. 2019); Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 171, 181 
(3d Cir. 2018). Compare Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1085 (11th Cir. 2007) (declaring 
that Title II applies to arrests without exception), with Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 
2000) (holding that Title II does not apply to an arrest before police officers “secur[e] the scene” and 
“ensur[e] that there is no threat to human life”). 
 55 Levin, supra note 30, at 272–73. 
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Section A of this Part explains the approach adopted in Hainze v. Rich-
ards, in which the Fifth Circuit held that exigent circumstances serve as a bar 
to Title II claims.56 Section B describes the approach embraced by a number of 
other courts, including the Ninth and the Eleventh Circuits, that considers exi-
gent circumstances when assessing the reasonableness of a proposed accom-
modation.57 Finally, Section C explores the First Circuit’s reluctance to adopt 
either approach.58 
A. Exigent Circumstances as a Bar to Title II Claims 
In 2000, in Hainze v. Richards, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted 
a unique approach for determining if and when Title II of the ADA applies to 
police encounters.59 In Hainze, a woman requested that the police bring her 
nephew, Kim Michael Hainze, who had a history of depression, to the hospital 
for mental health treatment.60 She indicated that Hainze was under the influ-
ence of alcohol and antidepressants and was threatening to commit suicide or 
“suicide by cop.”61 The officers located Hainze standing by the passenger door 
of a pickup truck carrying a knife.62 He approached the officers and, after he 
ignored their commands to stop, they fired two shots into his chest.63 
Having survived his gunshot wounds, Hainze brought a claim against the 
county for relief under Title II of the ADA using the “accommodation” theo-
ry.64 Specifically, he claimed that the county failed to reasonably accommodate 
his disability by failing to adopt a policy that protected individuals experienc-
ing mental health crises, thus resulting in discriminatory treatment.65 The Fifth 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See infra notes 59–68 and accompanying text. 
 57 See infra notes 69–86 and accompanying text. 
 58 See infra notes 87–90 and accompanying text. 
 59 See Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801 (holding that Title II does not cover a police officer’s conduct 
prior to securing the scene); see also Gray, 917 F.3d at 16 (noting that other courts have taken a dif-
ferent approach from that of the Fifth Circuit). 
 60 Hainze, 207 F.3d at 797. 
 61 Id. An individual commits “suicide by cop” by provoking a police officer to use deadly force 
against him or her. Id. at 797 n.1. 
 62 Id. at 797. Despite the cold weather, Hainze was not wearing shoes when the officers located 
him. Id. The officers emerged from their vehicles, drew their weapons, and demanded that Hainze 
back away from the truck. Id. Hainze replied with profanity. Id. 
 63 Id. The officers fired the shots when Hainze was approximately four to six feet away. Id. The 
entire encounter, from the time the officers located Hainze until the moment he was shot, lasted ap-
proximately twenty seconds. Id. 
 64 Id. at 797–98, 801. 
 65 Id. at 801. Hainze also claimed that by using deadly force to subdue him, the police officer 
denied him the benefits of the mental health training provided to all of the county’s officers. Id. at 
800. The Fifth Circuit rejected this claim, emphasizing that to successfully state a claim under Title II, 
an individual must be denied the benefits of a public entity’s “services, programs, or activities” by the 
public entity itself. Id. at 801. In so doing, the Fifth Circuit observed that Hainze was denied the bene-
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Circuit disagreed, concluding that Title II does not apply to ad hoc police en-
counters before the officer has ensured that the scene is secure and that no threat 
exists, irrespective of whether the encounter involves a disabled individual.66 As 
such, the Fifth Circuit implemented a bright-line rule, effectively holding that 
exigent circumstances serve as a complete bar to Title II claims.67 Stated another 
way, where exigent circumstances are present, the reasonable accommodation of 
an individual’s disability is not required.68 
B. Exigent Circumstances as a Factor in Determining the  
Reasonableness of an Accommodation 
Alternatively, other courts have held that Title II applies without excep-
tion to ad hoc police encounters, including arrests.69 These courts have con-
cluded that exigent circumstances do not bar Title II claims, but rather shed 
light on the reasonableness of a proposed accommodation.70 
                                                                                                                           
fits of the county’s mental health training by reason of his assault on the officer with a deadly weapon, 
not by the county itself. Id. 
 66 Id. at 801. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that law enforcement officials should not have to consider 
ADA compliance when exigent circumstances are present, as doing so would endanger the public. Id. 
Requiring officers to stop to consider other courses of action while making split-second decisions, the 
Fifth Circuit held, “is [not] the type of ‘reasonable accommodation’ contemplated by Title II.” Id. at 
801–02. 
 67 Id. at 801; see also Levin, supra note 30, at 286 (construing the Fifth Circuit’s approach to 
exigent circumstances as a complete bar to ADA claims). In Wilson v. City of Southlake, the Fifth 
Circuit referred to this rule as the “exigent circumstances exception.” 936 F.3d 326, 331 (2019) (inter-
nal quotations omitted). In that case, the family of an eight-year old boy with substantial disabilities 
brought a number of actions, including an action under Title II of the ADA, against the city of South-
lake, Texas, the Southlake Police Department, and School Resource Officer (SRO) Randy Baker. Id. 
at 328–29. The boy’s family argued that SRO Baker violated the ADA when he responded to an inci-
dent at school in which the boy attempted to hit the principal with nunchucks by handcuffing him and 
taking him to the principal’s office where SRO Baker continued to “berat[e] and antagoniz[e]” him. 
Id. The district court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the “exigent cir-
cumstances exception” applied. Id. at 330–31. It would put innocent people at risk, the court reasoned, 
to require SRO Baker to investigate the boy’s disability before working to defuse the situation. Id. at 
330. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the exception did not apply because there was no threat 
of imminent harm or, in other words, there were no exigent circumstances; “this was merely a disrup-
tion.” Id. at 331 (internal quotations omitted). 
 68 See Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801–02; see also Lefkowitz, supra note 22, at 725 (noting that the 
Hainze approach “is the only approach that renders Title II completely inapplicable in certain situa-
tions”); Levin, supra note 30, at 286 (stating that, under the Hainze approach, reasonable accommoda-
tions are not required before the scene is secure and no threat to human life exists). 
 69 Gray, 917 F.3d at 16 (noting that other courts have adopted a different approach from that of 
the Fifth Circuit); see, e.g., Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1085 (declaring that Title II applies to an arrest regard-
less of the exigent circumstances present); Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1221 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(stating that arrests are not categorically excluded from Title II). 
 70 See, e.g., Sheehan v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d 
in part and cert. dismissed in part by 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2015) (holding that “exigent circum-
stances inform the reasonableness analysis under the ADA”); Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1085 (concluding 
that “exigent circumstances presented by criminal activity . . . go more to the reasonableness of the 
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For example, in Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, decided in 2007, the 
Eleventh Circuit assessed a Title II claim that arose after police officers pulled 
over Steven Bircoll, who had no hearing in his left ear and ten percent hearing 
in his right, for a traffic stop.71 When Bircoll stepped out of his car, the officer 
smelled alcohol and administered several field sobriety tests.72 Ultimately, the 
officer determined that Bircoll was too impaired to drive and arrested him for 
driving under the influence (DUI).73 
Subsequently, Bircoll filed a lawsuit alleging that the county violated Ti-
tle II of the ADA by failing to provide him with auxiliary aids to facilitate his 
communication with the officer during the field sobriety tests.74 The Eleventh 
Circuit held that the applicability of the ADA was not in question, as Title II 
clearly prohibits discrimination by a public entity on the basis of disability.75 
Rather, the question was whether any modification to police procedure is rea-
sonable given the exigent circumstances.76 As such, the Eleventh Circuit con-
cluded that, in light of the serious public safety concerns that a DUI stop on the 
side of a highway entails, waiting for an oral interpreter before administering a 
field sobriety test would not have been a reasonable accommodation.77 
                                                                                                                           
requested ADA modification than whether the ADA applies in the first instance”). Similarly, the 
Fourth Circuit has held that determining whether a proposed accommodation is reasonable depends, at 
least in part, on the exigent circumstances present. Seremeth v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs Frederick Cty., 
673 F.3d 333, 339 (4th Cir. 2012). Deciding what constitutes a reasonable accommodation, the Fourth 
Circuit declared, is a fact and circumstances inquiry. Id. at 340. 
 71 Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1075–76. 
 72 Id. at 1076–77. Specifically, the officer allegedly administered the Romberg balance test, the 
one-leg stand exercise, the walk-and-turn test, and the finger-to-nose test. Id. at 1077–78. Bircoll and 
the officer disagreed as to the results of the aforementioned tests. Id. The officer testified that Bircoll 
passed the first test, the Romberg balance test, but Bircoll stated that he was unable to complete it. Id. 
at 1077. As to the second test, the one-leg stand test, Bircoll stated that he performed it easily, whereas 
the officer claimed that Bircoll failed. Id. Specifically, the officer stated that Bircoll failed this test 
because, in order to maintain balance, he needed to raise his arms and shuffle his feet. Id. Next, 
Bircoll testified that he successfully completed the third test, the walk-and-turn test. Id. at 1077–78. 
The officer, however, contended that Bircoll was unable to maintain his balance and failed as a result. 
Id. at 1078. Finally, Bircoll stated that he did not remember performing the finger-to-nose test. Id. 
According to the officer, however, Bircoll failed for a number of reasons, including that he missed the 
tip of his nose. Id. 
 73 Id. at 1078. 
 74 Id. at 1085. According to Bircoll, had the officer provided him with auxiliary aids, he would 
have better understood the officer’s requests. Id. Indeed, Bircoll contended that he asked the officer to 
call an interpreter, but the officer declined to do so. Id. at 1086. Notably, Bircoll also claimed that 
another officer subjected him to discrimination during the consent warning and breath test at the po-
lice station. Id. at 1085. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, however, finding instead that this officer 
maintained effective communication with Bircoll. Id. at 1088. 
 75 Id. at 1085. 
 76 Id. This question, which the Eleventh Circuit referred to as the “reasonable-modification in-
quiry,” must be decided case by case because of its fact-specific nature. Id. at 1085–86. 
 77 Id. at 1086. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that DUI stops are time-sensitive and that waiting 
for an oral interpreter would impede the officer’s ability to get an accurate measure of the driver’s 
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In 2014, in Sheehan v. City & County of San Francisco, the Ninth Circuit 
similarly held that exigent circumstances affect the reasonableness of a pro-
posed accommodation.78 Here, police officers had visited Teresa Sheehan, a 
mentally ill woman, after her social worker became concerned for her wellbe-
ing.79 When the officers arrived at her home, she grabbed a knife and threat-
ened to kill them, causing them to retreat to the hallway.80 After calling for 
backup, the officers drew their weapons and reentered the room.81 When 
Sheehan approached the officers with the knife once again, they shot her ap-
proximately five to six times.82 
Sheehan survived the encounter and subsequently brought an action 
against the city, asserting violations of Title II of the ADA under the “accom-
modation” theory.83 She alleged that the officers failed to accommodate her 
disability when they forcibly re-entered her room, rather than attempting to 
defuse the situation.84 In considering the extent to which Title II applies to ar-
rests, the Ninth Circuit expressly declined to adopt the Fifth Circuit’s ap-
proach, holding instead that the reasonableness of a proposed accommodation 
depends on the exigent circumstances present.85 Applying this rule to the facts 
                                                                                                                           
intoxication which, in turn, would endanger the public. Id. (noting that the DUI stop took place at 
approximately three in the morning). 
 78 Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232. 
 79 Id. at 1215. Sheehan’s social worker indicated that ever since Sheehan had stopped taking her 
medication, she had become “gravely disabled” and “a danger to others.” Id. Indeed, she had threat-
ened him when he went to visit her earlier that day at the group home for people suffering from men-
tal illness where she lived. Id. at 1215, 1217. As such, the social worker wanted the police’s assistance 
in bringing her to a mental health facility for a psychological assessment and treatment. Id. at 1215. 
 80 Id. at 1215. Sheehan admitted to having a knife and threatening the officers’ lives. Id. at 1219. 
She also testified that she had indicated to the officers that they did not possess a search warrant and 
that they needed a subpoena if they wanted to speak to her. Id.  
 81 Id. at 1215–16. One officer testified that she felt compelled to reenter the room in order to 
determine whether Sheehan had managed to escape or obtain additional weapons. Id. at 1219. She 
feared that if Sheehan had escaped, she would become a threat to others. Id. She conceded that she did 
not consider Sheehan’s mental illness when she made the decision to enter her room the second time. 
Id. 
 82 Id. at 1216. One of the officers stated that she first tried spraying Sheehan with pepper spray 
but that it did not succeed in stopping Sheehan’s advances. Id. at 1219–20. It was only then that she 
fired her weapon. Id. at 1220. According to Sheehan, however, the pepper spray caused her to lose her 
sight and she began to fall. Id. The officers, she claimed, then shot at her as she fell. Id. 
 83 Id. at 1216, 1232. 
 84 Id. at 1232–33. Specifically, Sheehan claimed that the officers should have communicated in a 
non-threatening manner and defused the situation by allowing additional time to pass before forcing 
their way back into the room and initiating a dangerous confrontation. Id. at 1233. 
 85 Id. at 1232. Although in City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, the Supreme Court re-
versed the Ninth Circuit’s holding as it pertained to qualified immunity, it did not address the question 
of Title II’s application to the arrest of an “armed, violent, and mentally ill suspect.” 135 S. Ct. at 
1772–73. As such, the Ninth Circuit’s holding regarding the scope of Title II’s application to arrests 
remains binding precedent as of the date of this Comment. See Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232 (holding 
that the reasonableness of a proposed accommodation depends on the exigent circumstances at hand); 
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at hand, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a reasonable jury could find that, 
once the officers had retreated from Sheehan’s room, the situation had been 
sufficiently defused so as to give the officers ample time to provide the ac-
commodations Sheehan demanded.86 
C. The First Circuit Joins the Discussion 
In order to adjudicate Judith Gray’s claim under Title II of the ADA, the 
First Circuit in Gray v. Cummings had to determine, as its sister courts had 
done, whether, and to what extent, Title II applies to ad hoc police encoun-
ters.87 The First Circuit expressly declined to do so and simply assumed, for 
the purpose of adjudicating the claim on narrower grounds, that Title II applies 
to ad hoc police encounters and that exigent circumstances should be consid-
ered when assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s actions.88 Thus, the 
First Circuit applied the approach embraced by both the Ninth and Eleventh 
Circuits.89 In so doing, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Athol on Gray’s ADA claim, holding that Gray 
failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the officer’s delib-
erate indifference to the risk of violating Title II, an element necessary for ob-
taining monetary damages on an ADA claim.90 
                                                                                                                           
Levin, supra note 30, at 292 (noting that “the Sheehan ADA finding remains good law in the Ninth 
Circuit”). 
 86 Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1233–34. 
 87 Gray, 917 F.3d at 16 (Retired Justice David Souter was sitting by designation). The First Cir-
cuit also addressed two additional matters of first impression: (1) whether “a public entity [may] be 
held liable under Title II for a line employee’s actions on a theory of respondeat superior,” and (2) 
whether “proof of a defendant’s deliberate indifference . . . [is] sufficient to support a plaintiff’s claim 
for damages under Title II.” Id. The First Circuit declined to answer either, simply assuming, to 
Gray’s benefit, that Athol could be held vicariously liable for Officer Cummings’s conduct under Title 
II of the ADA and that “deliberate indifference” was the applicable standard. Id. at 17. 
 88 Id. In so doing, the court reaffirmed the principle that courts need not decide unresolved legal 
issues when it is unnecessary to do so. Id. at 18 (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 736 F.3d 40, 40 (1st 
Cir. 2013)) (noting that Gray was required to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to Officer 
Cummings’s “deliberate indifference” to violating the ADA and that she failed to do so). Similarly, 
the Third Circuit declined to expressly adopt either approach for determining which accommodations, 
if any, are reasonable in the context of an arrest where exigent circumstances are present. Haberle, 
885 F.3d at 181 n.11. Instead, the Third Circuit denied the ADA claim due to the disabled individual’s 
failure to plead sufficient facts to demonstrate deliberate indifference. Id. The Third Circuit noted, 
however, that it may need to address the question in the future. Id. 
 89 Gray, 917 F.3d at 17; see Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1215 (agreeing with the Eleventh Circuit that 
the reasonableness analysis under Title II is informed by the exigent circumstances present); Bircoll, 
480 F.3d at 1085 (stating that the exigent circumstances speak to the reasonableness of a proposed 
ADA modification). 
 90 Gray, 917 F.3d at 18–19. To be eligible for monetary damages on a Title II claim, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate “intentional discrimination” by the public entity. Id. at 17. Although other courts 
have held that a showing of “deliberate indifference” may be sufficient to meet this requirement, the 
First Circuit has not so held. Id. Rather than do so here, the First Circuit simply assumed that a show-
ing of “deliberate indifference” would suffice. Id. at 8, 18–19 (assuming that “deliberate indifference” 
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III. THE FIRST CIRCUIT SHOULD REJECT THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S HAINZE 
APPROACH IN FAVOR OF THE MAJORITY APPROACH 
In Gray v. Cummings, the First Circuit adjudicated Gray’s ADA claim 
without deciding whether Title II requires police officers to reasonably ac-
commodate an individual with a disability during the course of an arrest where 
exigent circumstances are present.91 As such, the First Circuit missed an oppor-
tunity to set forth a standard that signals to the public, and law enforcement in 
particular, the importance of protecting the disabled during their encounters 
with police.92 The next time the First Circuit is presented with this issue, it 
should reject the Fifth Circuit’s approach in Hainze in favor of the more flexi-
ble approach adopted by the majority of circuits.93 
Section A of this Part demonstrates that the Hainze approach disregards 
the language of and legislative intent behind Title II of the ADA.94 Section B 
argues that the majority approach adopted by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, 
among others, allows for a more fact-specific inquiry, thus sufficiently address-
ing legitimate concerns for the safety of law enforcement personnel and the 
public at large.95 
                                                                                                                           
was sufficient because doing so was most favorable to Gray, as required at the summary judgment 
stage). As such, to prevail on the “effects” theory claim, Gray would have had to demonstrate that 
Officer Cummings knew that her refusal to comply with his demands was a manifestation of her disa-
bility. Id. at 18. Similarly, to prevail on the “accommodation” theory, Gray would have had to show 
that Officer Cummings knew that he was required to provide a reasonable accommodation. Id. The 
First Circuit concluded that Gray failed to make either showing. Id. Specifically, the First Circuit held 
that although Officer Cummings knew that Gray had a disability, due to his understanding that she 
was a “section 12 patient,” he was not aware of the nature of her disability; namely, he did not know 
that she was bipolar or that she was experiencing a manic episode. Id. Without this knowledge, the 
First Circuit reasoned, Officer Cummings would be unable to determine whether Gray’s behavior was 
a symptom of her disability and, accordingly, which accommodations, if any, were reasonable. Id. 
Notably, Gray’s complaint sought injunctive relief as well. Id. at 19. Specifically, Gray sought an 
injunction requiring Athol to (1) properly discipline its police officers by, for example, terminating 
officers who demonstrate a propensity to use excessive force, (2) implement a procedure for the ap-
propriate use of force against those who do not pose a threat, and (3) supply officers with training that 
would prepare them to adequately interact with individuals with mental illnesses. Complaint & Jury 
Demand at 7, Gray v. Cummings, 2017 WL 8942566 (D. Mass. 2015) (No. 15-10276). In order for 
Gray to be granted injunctive relief, however, she was required to demonstrate a likelihood of being 
tased again. Gray, 917 F.3d at 19. Because Gray merely claimed that, as a result of her disability, she 
is likely to encounter the police again, she did not meet the required showing. Id. 
 91 Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1, 17–18 (1st Cir. 2019). 
 92 Compare Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000) (failing to provide protection 
for disabled individuals under the ADA where exigent circumstances are present), with Sheehan v. 
City & Cty. of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d in part and cert. dismissed 
in part by 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2015) (providing additional protections for the disabled by holding 
that exigent circumstances shed light on the reasonableness of a proposed accommodation). 
 93 See infra notes 96–116 and accompanying text. 
 94 See infra notes 96–103 and accompanying text. 
 95 See infra notes 104–116 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Hainze Approach Overlooks the Language of, and  
Legislative Intent Behind, Title II of the ADA 
Congress intended for the ADA to serve as a “comprehensive national 
mandate” prohibiting the discrimination of individuals with disabilities.96 
Congress’s desire for Title II, in particular, to be far-reaching in scope is 
demonstrated by the absence of any statutory exceptions in its language.97 In 
contrast, Titles I and III contain “direct threat” exceptions, which provide that 
accommodations are not required where they would create a direct threat to the 
health or safety of others.98 By holding that Title II does not apply to an arrest 
where a threat to human life exists, the Fifth Circuit effectively wrote in a di-
rect threat exception and, consequently, overlooked the language of, and legis-
lative intent behind, the statute.99 
Notably, although there is no “direct threat” provision within the language 
of Title II itself, the Department of Justice promulgated a regulation containing 
such an exception.100 Specifically, the regulation provides that public entities 
need not accommodate a disabled individual where that individual directly 
threatens the health or safety of other members of the public.101 In determining 
whether an individual poses such a threat, however, the public entity must con-
sider “whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures 
                                                                                                                           
 96 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2018); see also Gray, 917 F.3d at 14 (noting that the purpose of the 
ADA is to put an end to discrimination against disabled individuals on a national scale). See generally 
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117; 12131–12165; 12181–12189 (providing for protection from disability 
discrimination related to employment, public entities, and public accommodations, respectively). 
 97 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Comparing Title II of the ADA with section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973, which was the key piece of disability legislation until the ADA was enacted 
in 1990, further illustrates Congress’s desire for the ADA to be far-reaching in scope. Compare Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 701–797 (2015)) (applying only to federally funded entities and programs), with 42 U.S.C. § 12132 
(covering a wider range of entities, including state and local governments). 
 98 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12113(b); id. § 12182(b)(3). Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination 
against disabled individuals in the employment context. Id. § 12112. Under Title I, a “direct threat” is 
defined as “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable 
accommodation.” Id. § 12111(3). Similarly, under Title III, which prohibits disability-related discrim-
ination in public accommodations, “direct threat means a significant risk to the health or safety of 
others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provi-
sion of auxiliary aids or services.” Id. § 12182(b)(3) (internal quotations omitted). 
 99 See Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801; see also Lefkowitz, supra note 22, at 734 (stating that the Fifth 
Circuit’s “securing the scene” exception has no basis in Title II of the ADA); Levin, supra note 30, at 
314 (noting that the Fifth Circuit’s approach is not rooted in either the legislative history or language 
of the ADA). Indeed, in a case addressing a claim of discrimination under Title II almost two decades 
later, Judge Ho declared that the Fifth Circuit in Hainze “created a categorical ‘exigent circumstances’ 
defense that appears nowhere in the text of either the [ADA] or the Rehabilitation Act.” Wilson v. 
City of Southlake, 936 F.3d 326, 333 (2019) (Ho, J., concurring). Moreover, he stated that it is “not 
surprising that every circuit to opine on this issue has . . . rejected [the Fifth Circuit’s] approach.” Id. 
 100 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(a) (2019) (providing a “direct threat” exception to the prohibitions 
under Title II of the ADA). 
 101 Id. 
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. . . will mitigate the risk [of such a threat].”102 Thus, unlike the Fifth Circuit’s 
bright-line rule, the Department of Justice’s “direct threat” exception recogniz-
es that some threats can be mitigated through “reasonable modifications” and, 
consequently, that some police encounters involving a perceived threat to the 
health or safety of others should still be covered by the ADA.103 
B. The Majority Approach Allows for a Fact-Specific Inquiry, 
Appropriately Balancing Legitimate Public Safety  
Concerns with the Rights of the Disabled 
As the First Circuit noted in Gray, determining the extent to which Title II 
applies to arrests is particularly challenging because it requires balancing two 
important concerns—protecting the rights of disabled individuals on the one 
hand and ensuring the safety of law enforcement personnel and the general 
public on the other.104 Indeed, the primary argument in favor of the Hainze ap-
proach is that police officers already have the difficult task of quickly identify-
ing and responding to life-threatening situations.105 In light of these difficult 
circumstances, requiring police officers to stop to consider whether their con-
duct complies with the ADA would endanger them and the general public.106 
Although this argument is certainly not without merit, it fails to recognize that 
scenarios exist in which requiring a police officer to consider ADA compliance 
before taking action would not put anyone’s safety at risk, even where exigent 
circumstances may be present.107 The majority approach, on the other hand, 
acknowledges this possibility.108 
                                                                                                                           
 102 Id. § 35.139(b). 
 103 See id.; Levin, supra note 30, at 312 (arguing that when threats can be mitigated by “reasona-
ble modifications,” officers are not exempt from the requirements under Title II of the ADA). 
 104 See Gray, 917 F.3d at 20 (emphasizing that this is a difficult case because of the two compet-
ing considerations). 
 105 See Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801 (describing the numerous challenges police officers face when 
conducting “in-the-field investigations”); see also Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 536 (6th Cir. 
2008), abrogated on other grounds by Anderson v. City of Blue Ash, 798 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(concluding that interpreting the ADA to place too stringent a requirement on police officers would 
inhibit their ability to respond to rapidly changing situations). 
 106 See Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801 (stating that Congress’s intention in enacting the ADA was not to 
prevent the discrimination of disabled individuals at the expense of public safety); see also Brief of 
Amici Curiae Int’l Mun. Lawyers Ass’n & Mass. Chiefs of Police Ass’n, Inc., in Support of Appellees 
& Affirmance, at 28, Gray, 917 F.3d 1 (No. 18-1303) (“[I]f a police officer is worried about ADA 
liability in rapidly evolving, dangerous situations involving a potentially mentally ill suspect, that 
officer may hesitate, which could result in the loss of life, either to the officer or a member of the 
public or to the suspect.”). 
 107 See Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801 (creating a bright line rule holding that where exigent circum-
stances are present, claims under Title II of the ADA cannot be raised). 
 108 See, e.g., Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232 (holding that exigent circumstances speak to the reasona-
bleness of a proposed accommodation rather than bar Title II claims). 
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Arguably, Gray is one such case in which considering ADA compliance 
would not have threatened the officer’s or the public’s safety, despite the exist-
ence of exigent circumstances.109 When Officer Cummings first located Gray 
and demanded that she return to the hospital, he followed her at a distance of 
approximately one hundred feet.110 Pausing to consider whether the ADA re-
quired him to continue to monitor her from a distance until an ambulance ar-
rived, as Gray asserted was reasonably necessary to accommodate her disabil-
ity, would have been unlikely to create an additional threat to Officer Cum-
mings’s safety.111 
Once Officer Cummings closed in on Gray and she began to approach 
him with clenched fists, however, some level of threat to his safety arguably 
arose.112 Under the Hainze approach, the factfinder’s analysis would be limited 
to determining whether that threat rose to the level of exigent circumstances—
a yes or no determination.113 The factfinder would be stripped of the oppor-
tunity to fully evaluate, for example, the severity of a Taser relative to other 
courses of action that might have been available to Officer Cummings at the 
time—a factor that sheds light on the reasonableness of the Officer’s ac-
tions.114 
When the First Circuit is called upon to revisit the extent of Title II’s ap-
plicability to ad hoc police encounters, it should adopt the majority approach, 
as it allows for a fact-specific inquiry that maximizes protections for the disa-
bled, while still promoting the safety of law enforcement personnel and the 
public at large.115 Indeed, exigent circumstances and the unique risks they pose 
                                                                                                                           
 109 See Gray, 917 F.3d at 6 (noting that it was not until Officer Cummings came within five feet 
of Gray that she approached him with clenched fists). 
 110 Id.; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 38, at 6. 
 111 See Gray, 917 F.3d at 6 (failing to provide a plausible reason as to why Officer Cummings 
could not continue to follow Gray at a distance of approximately one hundred feet, as he had done for 
roughly twenty-five to thirty seconds, until an ambulance arrived, particularly in light of the fact that 
Gray was located only a quarter of a mile from the hospital). 
 112 See id. at 9 (noting that a jury could find that, under the circumstances, Officer Cummings 
reasonably believed that Gray presented a risk of danger to him). 
 113 See Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801 (holding that Title II is inapplicable to ad hoc police encounters 
before the officer is able to “ensur[e] that there is no threat to human life”). 
 114 See Gray, 917 F.3d at 19 (noting that “nationally recognized police standards” would have 
required Officer Cummings to either wait for backup or call an ambulance before approaching her); 
Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801 (establishing a rule that bars liability where exigent circumstances are pre-
sent). Indeed, in considering Gray’s § 1983 claim against Officer Cummings, the First Circuit noted 
that, when looking at the record most favorably to Gray, “a reasonable jury could find that Gray had 
committed no crime and that she posed no threat to [Officer] Cummings when he tased her.” Gray, 
917 F.3d at 9. 
 115 See Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232 (holding that exigent circumstances inform the reasonableness 
of a contemplated accommodation); Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1085 (concluding that the exigent circum-
stances that accompany a DUI stop on the side of a highway impact the reasonableness of proposed 
accommodations); Myers, supra note 29, at 1422 (arguing that the approach adopted by the Ninth and 
Eleventh Circuits properly addresses concerns for the safety of police officers and the general public). 
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still play a substantial role in the analysis, but rather than serve as a complete 
bar to Title II claims, they weigh in the balance of determining the reasonable-
ness of a proposed accommodation.116 
CONCLUSION 
Courts across the country have been faced with the difficult question of 
whether, and to what extent, Title II of the ADA applies to police encounters, 
including arrests. Most circuits have held that Title II applies to arrests without 
exception and, therefore, that officers have a duty to reasonably accommodate 
an individual’s disability irrespective of the circumstances. In contrast, the 
Fifth Circuit has held that Title II does not apply before officers have secured 
the scene and ensured that there is no threat. As such, the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that exigent circumstances bar Title II claims. Recognizing the compet-
ing concerns implicated by protecting individuals with disabilities and ensur-
ing that law enforcement personnel are fully able to perform their important 
duties, it is not surprising that the First Circuit was reluctant to articulate an 
appropriate standard for evaluating police conduct. In failing to answer this 
question, however, the First Circuit missed an opportunity to set forth a stand-
ard that demonstrated to the public, and law enforcement personnel in particular, 
the importance of protecting the disabled during their encounters with police. 
When the First Circuit is inevitably presented with this question once again, it 
should adopt the majority approach as it better reflects the language of, and leg-
islative intent behind, Title II and sufficiently balances the aforementioned 
concerns by enabling the factfinder to engage in a fact-specific inquiry. 
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